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PREFACE 
This paper has been prepared by Malcolm Harper, Professor of Enterprise 
Development and Director of the Enterprise Development Centre at Cranfield 
School of Management, Bedford, United Kingdom. Meant as a contribution to an 
IL0 workshop of experts on training in the urban informal sector of developing 
countries (Turin, 7-11 April, 1987). It is hoped that readers of this series 
of discussion papers will also find it stimulating. 
Professor Harper presents four cases of training for the informal sector 
in Colombia, Malawi, Somalia and the Sudan. It is particularly interesting to 
find similarities and differences in the way in which relative outsiders have 
conceived of training in the informal sector and how they have subsequently 
put their ideas into practice. Training micro-enterpreneurs, it appears, 
demands approaches which are both comprehensive and location-specific and 
which may be far removed from conventional methods of management development 
and vocational training. 

I. INTRODUCTION 
The informal sector has been the subject of numerous conferences, Learned 
articles , case studies and discussions. These have contributed to our 
understanding of why and how people earn their living in this way, and they 
have identified many of the problems with which informal sector workers are 
faced. Rather less, however, has been said about practical ways co assist 
them. 
It is widely recognised that official harrassment and inappropriate 
regulations have been, and often still are, major problems for informal sector 
workers. Since steps are being taken by governments in many countries to 
remove some of the constraints which make life in the informal sector more 
difficult than necessary, it has become possible to consider what else 
governments could do to assist the informal sector. 
Credit is the most important problem in the eyes of most people who work 
in the informal sector, and three out of the four programmes described in the 
following case studies include credit, or access to credit, as part of the 
package of assistance which they offer. 
As with larger, more formal “small businesses”, however, the regulatory 
climate and the lack of credit are not the only problems. Emp layers and 
workers in the informal sector display remarkable persistence and ingenuity, 
often under difficult conditions, but we must not allow our admiration for 
this to lead to the conclusion that everything they do is the optimum response 
to the circumstances in which they are. The quality of many informal sector 
products is very low, even when the simple equipment of the enterprises and 
the modest needs of their clients are taken into account; their methods are . 
often inefficient and their standard of “management”, broadly defined, is very 
low. Some of these weaknesses may be overcome by training of some sort, in 
combination with other forms of assistance. 
The case studies briefly describe four examples of assistance programmes ’ 
for informal sector enterprises, in Colombia, Malawi, Somalia, and Sudan, * 
which have included some element of training and which have, in part at least, 
achieved some success. 
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It is not suggested that these programmes can be “replicated” anywhere 
else, in detail or even in broad concepts, but it is hoped that they may 
provide some ideas for others who are trying to design and implement similar 
programmes adapted as necessary to local conditions. 
A common format has been adopted for each of the four case studies. 
Following introductory remarks, the scene is set and details are included on 
project origins and design features, on project objectives and activities, on 
inputs and outputs, and on impact and lessons which may be drawn. 
II. THE DESAP PROGRAMME OF THE CARVAJAL FOUNDATION IN CALI, COLOMBIA 
This case study. describes a programme which combines classroom training, 
individual advisory services and credit in an unusually effective package to 
assist informal sector enterprises in Cali, Colombia. The programme was 
started in 1977, and has since become a widely admired example of how urban 
micro-enterprises can economically and effectively be assisted through private 
initiative. The DESAP Programme of the Carvajal Foundation has been widely 
imitated in Colombia and other parts of Latin America, and a number of 
international assistance agencies, which had been invited by the Foundation to 
provide assistance in a variety of specific ways at the inception of the 
programme, are now attempting to apply some aspects of what has been learned 
in Cali to other places. Success is a function of the commitment and 
enthusiasm of the Foundation, and of the programme’s own staff, which are 
difficult to replicate, but there are nevertheless a number of lessons which 
can be learned and applied elsewhere. 
Setting 
The DESAP Programme was set up and continues to operate in Cali, which is 
with well over one million people the third largest city of Colombia. Like 
all major Latin American cities, Cali is growing very rapidly, and although it 
is a major manufacturing centre which serves the needs of the fertile 
agricultural area of Cauca Valley, the employment opportunities in formal 
sector industry and services including the public sector are in no way 
sufficient for the city’s own population or for the large numbers who migrate 
there from the valley and surrounding hills. There is therefore a very large 
and active informal sector, which has in fact been widely studied, and many of 
the micro-entrepreneurs involved in informal enterprise have the energy, 
initiative, and ambition to progress beyond subsistence self-employment. 
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Their level of technical skill is generally quite high, and the quality 
and design of their products is such that they can compete with factory-made 
items. Formal credit was however inaccessible to these people, the legal and 
regulatory situation was hostile to the development of their businesses and 
they had no way of learning the management skills necessary to go through the 
barriers which preVented them from expanding their enterprises. The 
government in Colombia was aware of these problems, but had not found 
satisfactory ways of addressing them. The Carvajal Foundation took the 
initiative and showed how this could be done. 
Project Origins and Design 
The Carvajal group of companies is a large multi-national organisation in 
printing, publishing and packaging, based in Cali with operations elsewhere in 
Colombia, in Latin America and further afield. In 1962, the Carvajal family 
established the Carvajal Foundation, donating 40 percent of the shares of the 
groups for this purpose. The Foundation supports a wide range of community 
and social activities throughout Cali and the Cauca Valley, all of which have 
a strong f ecus on “ownership” and control by the people who benefit, together 
with clearly defined targets for eventual self-sustained ability. 
It was clear from the Foundation’s work with schools, recreation centres, 
clinics and other community activities that a large proportion of the people 
who benefitted from these earned their living from informal sector activities 
and that they had the necessary initiative and ambition to develop and expand 
their businesses providing they could overcome certain constraints. Learning 
from experience-of similar activities in Brazil, which were themselves based 
in part on earlier work in Kenya and elsewhere, the Foundation carried out a 
census of informal sector enterprises in Cali which included a simple, 
diagnostic study of their needs. They then put together and integrated a 
programme of classroom training and on-site consultancy which still forms the 
basis of the programme. They also initiated a search for credit funding and, 
more importantly, for one or more suitable imtermediaries through which credit 
could be made available as necessary to the informal enterprises which had 
through the programme reached a level of management skill where they could 
make effective use of it. 
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It is important to stress that DESAP is not a project undertaken only for 
a limited period. The Carvajal Foundation is clearly committed to the long- 
term prosperity of the city and there are no illusions that the problems of 
the informal sector will be solved overnight. The Foundation is committed to 
the DESAP Programme, as it is to its other activities, for as long as there is 
a need and as long as the programme can be seen to be making a cost-effective 
contribution to satisfy that need. 
This local initiative and Long-term commitment may be the most important 
factor distinguishing DESAP from other programmes; DESAP is also unusual in 
that it included from the start training, on site counselling and finance. 
This was possible because the Carvajal Foundation is not a bank, a training 
institution or an advisory service, but more broadly a body to meet local 
needs without bias in favour of any particular type of remedy. 
The Foundation obtained as much information as they could about similar 
programmes elsewhere, but there was no attempt to replicate another “model”. 
The DESAP Programme was designed strictly for conditions in Cali and the 
Foundation has discouraged other organisations from trying to replicate DESAP 
elsewhere. They encourage others to Learn*from.the Cali experience, but 
stress the necessity of dealing with each situation, and indeed each 
entrepreneur, as an individual case. 
Objectives and Activities 
The original aim of the DESAP Programme was and still is to enable micro- 
entrepreneurs of Cali to manage their businesses more effectively. The 
programme is concerned with access to credit, for many of its beneficiaries, 
but the main activity lies in training and on-site counselling in order to 
improve the business ability of its clients. Although aims and objectives 
have not been fundamentally changed, the topics, learning methods and other 
aspects of training have been substantially modified all the time. 
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Improved management, it must be stressed, is not considered as an end in 
itself; higher standards of book-keeping for example have no value per se. 
The ultimate objective is improved possibilities for survival and growth of 
the enterprises, which will in turn lead to higher incomes and increased 
employment opportunities. 
The DESAP Programme was from the outset managed by its own staff, 
selected by the Carvajal Foundation. The Board and Directors of the 
Foundation have always taken a keen interest in DESAP but they Leave basic 
decisions and day to day management of the programme to the staff. Some of 
the generally young and deeply commited staff have part-time businesses of 
their own; a reasonable rate of staff turnover is encouraged in order to 
maintain motivation and enthusiasm. 
The Director and senior management of the Carvajal companies are 
regularly involved in the work of the Foundation, including DESAP, and this 
ensures both that the programme itself is run in a business like way and also 
that the content of its courses and advice are realistic and practical. 
There are three basic courses dealing with simple record keeping, costing 
and investment p Lanning . Each consists of five 2-3 hour evening sessions, and 
each is followed by a number of individual on-site consultations which are 
meant to assist the client to apply what was learned in the course. 
The three courses are a very closely integrated package; they have to be 
taken in the above sequence, and although some clients only complete the first 
or the first and the second, and gain significantly from this, the three of 
them should result in the preparation of an investment proposal, which is 
submitted to the associated financial institutions for a loan. 
At first the course material was based on standard curricula, but after 
some experience, the staff developed a special series of cases, exercises and 
other material, drawing heavily on publications from elsewhere in Latin 
America and Kenya, and with the assistance of consuLtants from Appropriate 
%zchnology International. In the actual classroom sessions extensive use is 
made of the clients own experience, eliciting the descriptions of individual 
probLems as a basis for classroom discussion. 
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The trainers themselves are involved in the on-site counselling, and this 
ensures that what they tell their class is directly relevant to the reality of 
the small businesses owned by the trainees. 
The first course introduces clients to very basic recording systems, and 
helps them to draw up a simple balance sheet and statement of profit and loss 
for their enterprise. Many are surprised at this stage to find that their 
business is losing money, often because ‘of excessive personal withdrawals; 
they may be asked in that case to take remedial action before proceeding with 
the course. 
The second course focuses on costing, and is designed to help the 
enterpreneurs to identify ways of increasing their profits. The traditional 
approach of break-even analysis is used, but taught in such a way that clients 
can see how it applies to their businesses, rather than being an abstract 
exercise of no direct relevance. After this course, a consultant helps them 
to calculate their own break-even point and to develop ways of increasing 
their profitabLiLity. 
The third course is designed to help clients identify ways in which they 
can expand their businesses, usually with the aid of a Loan. By this stage 
they should be making reasonably efficient use of the resources they already 
possess, so that DESAP avoids the common error of facilitating access to 
credit for people who are not making effective use of what they already have. 
Clients go through the sequence of three courses at their own pace but it 
usually takes them about three months, including the individual counselling 
sessions. The average client remains in touch with the Foundation for around 
two years, attending further courses as described below, receiving additional 
counselling and repaying whatever credit may have been received to the 
appropriate institutions. 
Further courses are also offered in general business administration, 
marketing, selling, motivation, quality control, production management, 
financial management and commercial law. These are not’part of any sequence, 
and clients take them because they realise that they have particular training 
needs, after taking the three basic courses. 
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Clients pay about $15 per course, for all the courses; this fee also 
covers the on-site counseLLing. This money can be borrowed and repayed over 
two years if necessary; although the Foundation subsidises the programme, 
these fees do make a significant contribution to the finances of the DESAP 
Programme. 
The courses take place at the DESAP headquarters, situated in a fairly 
modest building in the heart of the city of Cali; and since all the courses 
are held in the evenings clients can attend without disrupting their 
businesses. 
Inputs and Outputs 
The average cost of serving a client for two years is about $250, 
including the courses and the counselling. About half of this is covered by 
the fees which clients pay, while a further 20% is earned from a proportion of 
the interest charged on the Loans they may get. The balance is met by the 
Foundation, and this proportion is falling slowly, so that DESAP will 
eventually be self-sustaining. This is the ultimate goal of all the 
Foundation’s activities, since its’ sponsors believe that any business support 
activity should, in the final analysis, itself be a self-supporting business. 
DESAP employs around 25 staff; a significant proportion of these are 
university students in business and other fields, enlarging their experience 
and earning their way through college. A number of them have business 
experience and many run their own part-time enterprise at the same time. They 
are mainly trained on-the- job, sharing training and counselling duties with 
more experienced staff, and there is a substantial exchange of staff and 
experience with other, similar programmes in Colombia and elsewhere. This 
exchange also provides the senior staff with an opportunity to broaden their 
outlook by helping other organisations to learn from DESAP. 
Around three hundred potential clients are invited each month to attend 
an initial evening briefing session. These people apply on their own 
init iat ive , or are contacted by DESAP staff or through other programmes of the 
Foundation. About two hundred attend the session, which is designed to 
promote the courses’, but also involves presentation of references and a degree 
of guided self selection. About one hundred and fifty of those who come to 
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A further fifty drop out after the first course, either because they do 
not wish to keep records or they feel they have Learned enough. After the 
initial counselling sessions,, a further thirty decide not to go on to the 
costing course because they wish more firmly to establish and learn from their 
new recording system before proceeding further. 
Around seventy clients thus take the costing course, and fifty of these 
go on to the course on investment planning. Some ten of these decide they do 
not want to borrow money, while about five are turned down by the financial 
institutions. About thirty five of the original one hundred and fifty who 
come to the first evening session thus receive a loan, and the current 
re-payment record is well over 952. 
It should be stressed that while only a rather small proportion of those 
who enrol at the beginning actually receive a loan, those who do not obtain 
credit should in no way be regared as failures. Many of them re-enter the 
system later, many of them decide to take other courses outside the basic 
sequence while others find that what they have learned is of sufficient value 
to satisfy their immediate needs. The sequential system allows all to proceed 
at their own pace, and avoids pressuring people to attempt to expand their 
businesses, or to borrow money, when this is beyond the level of their 
aspirations or ability. 
Imnact and Lessons 
The DESAP Programme is continuing to operate, but its sponsors have 
resisted the temptation to expand it beyond the city of Cali or to suggest in 
any way that it represents a universal “model” which can be applied elsewhere. 
About twenty voluntary agencies and others from Colombia and beyond have sent 
people to study and work with DESAP, and have applied many aspects of its 
system to their own situations. DESAP’s staff have also worked with them to 
help with the establishment of support programmes for informal sector 
enterprises, but they have always stressed that each programme must be 
designed on the basis of local circumstances and, perhaps even more 
importantly, on the basis of the nature of the institution and the individuals 
who will be running it. 
- 10 - 
The programme has been widely admired internationally, and the average 
cost of $1,000 per extra job created compares very favourably with other job 
creation programmes in Colombia. In addition, the fact that clients are 
willing to pay the not unsubstantial fees demonstrates th,at they themselves 
recognise the value of the programme in terms of increased profitability. 
DESAP cannot claim to have revolutionized the employment situation in 
Colombia, or even in Cali, but it has made a modest and cost-effective 
contribution to solving some of the problems of informal sector enterprises in 
the city and, by example, in other communities as well. 
As always, personality and commitment are probably more important factors 
for success than any operational policies or practices, but the following 
features can be singled out as being unusual and perhaps having had some 
influence on DESAP's success: 
The programme originated locally; it was in no way imposed or even 
suggested from outside. 
The programme has remained relatively small, and its’ sponsors have 
resisted any temptation to expand beyond the one city where it 
started. 
. 
The programme was not initiated by government but by a private 
organisation with a strong commitment to self-sustaining enterprise 
as an alternative to dependancy-creating welfare and relief. 
The staff are young, enterprise-oriented and continually renewed; 
they have from the beginning been eager to learn from others, both 
within their own country and beyond; they have used external 
assistance rather than being used by it, 
The programme integrates classroom training, on site counselling 
and improved access to credit. The credit operation is run by a 
separate organisation. 
The programme is designed in stages so that each stage is a 
worthwhile activity for the client if he or she decides to go no 
further. 
The clients pay a significant fee for their participation in the 
prograxiime ; the ptogramai is to’.a Large extent dependant on these 
earnings and on the results of the credit operation. 
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The case of Don Fernando - The Shoemaker 
Don Fernando makes women’s shoes and sandals in a workshop behind his 
home. He employs two helpers, and has a stitching machine and some simple 
hand tools. He makes fashionable shoes of modern designs which he sells 
mainly to Large shopkeepers in the city centre of Cali. He achieves a 
turnover of around $500 a month, and he believes that he could sell perhaps 
twice this amount if he had more working capital. 
Fernando’s current working capital amounts to some $180, which is all 
invested in raw material and semi-finished goods. As soon as he has finished 
a batch of shoes, he takes them to the customers; they pay with cheques which 
are post-dated for two or three months, and Fernando has to discount these at 
around 81: per month in order to obtain cash. Although he could borrow more 
money at this rate of interest he does not feel he can afford the cost. 
Fernando had taken the record keeping and costing courses from DESAP, and 
is currently working with his adviser in order to identify ways of reducing 
his costs and getting better results from his existing working capital. He 
hopes to proceed to the investment planning course, and then to apply for a 
$1,000 loan in order to increase his working capital. He knows that he will 
have to pay 24% interest per year for this money, but this is far cheaper than 
8% per month, and he is confident that he will then be able to hire two more 
helpers and significantly increase his own earnings. 
Fernando admits that his main motive for entering the DESAP Programme was 
to obtain a loan, since other sources of credit are quite inaccessible to 
him. He recognises however, that he has learned a great deal from the two 
courses he has attended, and from the individual counselling, and is looking 
forward to the third course. He agrees that if he had been able to borrow 
$1,000 without taking the courses before, he might easily have failed to have 
made effective use of the additional capital and thus have put himself in an 
even worse position than he was in already. 
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III. THE RURAL TRADE SCHOOL IN SALIMA, MALAWI 
. 
This case study attempts to give a brief description of the origins, 
present operations and apparent results of the Salima Rural Trade School in 
Malawi. The school offers a twpyear vocational training programme which aims 
to develop young people into successful self-employed artisans. The school is 
is located in a small town, and many if not most of its graduates start their 
businesses in small towns and villages. Its case is worthy of inclusion in 
any study of informal sector training activities because of the unusual 
approach taken to the training itself and because of its results, in terms of 
numbers of businesses started and surviving which appear to be unusually good. 
Setting 
The school is Located in the town of Salima, in some disused buildings on 
the shore of Lake Malawi. Its trainees are selected from all parts of the 
country, and after training they start their business in many different 
places, both rural and urban. The school is therefore not focussed on the 
particular problems of its immediate neighbourhood; it was established at 
Salima because the premises were available and there was already some local 
vocational training activity in the area. Salima is also centrally Located, 
not to far from Lilongwe, the country’s capital and easily reached by lake and 
road. 
The school was started against a background of severe un- and 
underemployment among young people. Its activities have always been closely 
integrated with the national policy of promoting self-discipline and other . 
traditional virtues. This policy is expressed in a variety of different 
ways; the educational system, from primary school to university, stresses 
personal behaviour as well as the acquisition of skills, and the country’s 
leaders attempt through their own example to promote traditional values. 
The Malawian Young Pioneer Corps is a typical example of this approach to 
national development, and the Salima Rural Trade School grew out of the Young 
Pioneers. The school can therefore be said to be a most unusual combination 
of training for self-employment and of personal development along the lines 
encouraged by the Government. 
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Project Origins and Design 
The Malawi Government established the Salima Rural Trade School in 1974, 
with some support from the German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ) in 
the form of technical trainers and some capital assistance for the necessary 
building modifications. 
The school was started because at the same time there was a need for new 
jobs and a serious shortage of carpenters, blacksmiths and builders throughout 
the country particulary in the more isolated small towns and villages. The 
Government of Malawi has, in contrast to many other African countries, always 
concentrated its development efforts on agriculture, recognising that this is 
and will continue for many years to be the major source of income for the vast 
majority of the people. Malawi was probably worse-off than many other 
countries in terms of technical manpower at the time of independence; the 
country was regarded as Little more than an appendage to the Rhodesian 
Federation, and its foreign owned tea and tobacco farms were the only 
significant economic activity recognised by the authorities. At tempts t0 
develop indigenous small-holder agriculture, therefore, had to be supplemented 
by the development of suitable Local services to satisfy the needs of Malwian 
farmers. 
The activities of carpentry, blacksmithing and construction were chosen 
because these were obviously the most seriously needed. Since there was no 
indigenous artisanal tradition, and the school was planned from the outset to 
recruit its students from those completing their service with the Young 
Pioneers, there was no real problem in assessing the training needs and 
designing the curriculum. Clearly the students had to learn the complete 
craft, from the most elementary stages to a Level where they would be capable 
of running their own informal enterprises. 
The actual syllabus originally was and still is typical of a fairly 
traditional craft training programme. The West German trainers who were 
involved in the early stages were able to make a particularly valuable 
contribution in training content because of the well-known tradition of 
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thoroughly grounded apprenticeship in the Federal Republic. However, the 
emphasis on self-employment from the very beginning of the school was 
unusual. The Salima initiative was at the time certainly unique in Malawi, 
and possibly in the rest of Africa as well. This means that the Salima Rural 
Trade SchooI has accumulated many years of experience in a field in which 
Large numbers of institutions are now trying to enter for the first time; it 
has therefore lessons to offer from which others can Learn. 
Objectives and Activities 
The general aim of the school is to provide trainees with skills which 
will enable them both to create jobs for themselves and to provide badly 
needed services to the people of Malawi. This objective has remained more or 
less unchanged up to the present; although a number of improvements have been 
made in the curriculum on the basis of experience over the Last twelve years, 
the basic structure of the programme has remained substantially what it was. 
The school may have been the subject of an external aid effort at its 
inception, but the idea and much of the initial resources came not from 
foreign donors but from the Government of Malawi. The school, however, has 
never suffered from the “project” mentality which condemns so many worthwhile 
activities of this kind to a specific Life time, with periodic upheavals as 
the project is either rewritten, renewed or dropped. The school is a school 
and not a “project”. Its continued existence will, presumably, depend on its 
ability to meet the country’s needs effectively. This may be one of the 
reasons why the school has succeeded to the extent it has. 
Sixty trainees are very rigorously selected each year from the very Large 
number of young men who apply, on completing their period of service with the 
Malawi Young Pioneers. Entry to the Young Pioneers is itself very 
competitive, so that the school’s trainees are in a sense the pick of the 
best. They are not selected on the basis of their educational qualifications, 
and many have not been to secondary school. Applicants who have some evidence 
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of prior experience or interest in their chosen craft are favoured, and the 
complete selection process inVOlVes an aptitude test, an interview in their 
home area and a final two-week induction period at Salima. As the school is 
known to be directed at self-employment rather than jobs with others, 
candidates apply with this in mind, and the selection process further ensures 
that all who will attend are fully committed to scatting their own enterprise. 
The programme emphasises the development of self confidence, self- 
discipline and independence; these are achieved through the overall regime 
and tone of the school, as well as through the training approach that is 
adopted in teaching the various skills. The school resembles in many ways a 
military camp, and army officers are included in the staff. The trainees Live 
in barrack-like dormitories, they are woken early and kept fully occupied 
throughout the day, and good housekeeping, physical fitness and personal 
cleanliness are stressed in addition to the technical skills in their 
respective crafts. 
The technical training is similarly founded on self-reliance; the 
carpenters make their own tools, from the very beginning, and the blacksmiths 
each construct a portable forge which they can take with them when they 
establish their businesses. These may not be as durable or as effective as 
imported tools or equipment, but it is felt that the psychological advantages 
of trainees having to make their own tools and equipment more than outweigh 
any inadequacies in their quality. 
The practical aspects of the training are further stressed by the 
provision of a “hobby shop” in which trainees are encouraged to work during 
the few spare hours they have during the weekends. They make small items for 
sale in the local area, using materials which they buy from the school, so 
that they are in a modest way already in business when they are in training. 
When they leave the school, the students take the tools which they have 
made, together with a small supply of raw materials; They do not receive any 
finance as such, and since raw material supply is probably the most difficult 
Problem for small-scale artisans in Malawi, not because of fundamental 
shortages- but because of scattered Locations and high transport costs, the 
initial supply at least helps them to overcome this problem at the beginning. 
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Placement and follow-up are an integrated part of the prograrmne. ‘Ihe 
school discourages trainees from setting their businesses up in their home 
areas, because of the problems of family pressure and other constraints; 
locations are jointly selected by the trainees and the Placement Officer, and 
students spend a trial period in their chosen location before finally leaving 
the school, in order to be sure that it is suitable. Short refresher courses 
are also provided, and the school attempts to continue supporting its ex- 
students with raw materials supplies and other assistance, although the great 
distances involved have made this very difficult for those who are located 
outside the immediate area of Salima. 
Inputs and Outputs 
In addition to the initial assistance from GTZ, other donors including 
the European Development Fund, have contributed funds for equipment and 
technical assistance, but the basic activity is locally funded. The operating 
budget of the school is about $200,000 per year, met from Government of Malawi 
funds. 
There are ten fullTtime trainers, and a further 70 administrative, 
clerical, support, maintenance and other employees, making a total of 80 
altogether. The school selects 60 students each year as has been described; 
a few leave voluntarily, and others fail to pass the tests at the end of the 
first year, so that 50 students complete the second year and are posted to 
start their businesses. The school’s records are not totally up to date, but 
it is stated that at the end of 1984, 450 people had completed the course 
since the school was started in 1974, and that three-quarters of them, or 
approximately 340, had set up informal businesses which were still in 
operation at that time. 
No comprehensive survey appears to have,been carried out as to the scale 
of their activities, but a number of individual contacts suggest that some of 
the Salima trainees are employing others as well as themselves, and they have 
accumulated sufficient capital to buy some new tools and to build up small 
stocks of raw material. They also appear to have successfully integrated 
themselves into the local communities, in some cases they have married local” 
and have generally overcome any tribal or community differences. 
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Many of the trainees appear, however, to have difficulty in the 
management as opposed to the craft related aspects of their businesses. Few 
keep any records, they do not plan for future expansion or even for modest 
capital purchases, and many seem unaware of the need to maintain their tools 
correctly. ‘Ihe raw material supplies are always a difficulty, and the small 
initial stock is in no way sufficient to enable many to build up the funds to 
buy the rather large quantities which are necessary if they are to be 
transported at a reasonable cost. Some trainees who are in business near 
Salima are able to benefit from the school’s own material supplies, and others 
have developed local sources; in some cases however, particularly in the more 
remote areas, the demand for their products and services, is so small that any 
reasonable stocks of materials would be quite uneconomic. 
It is obviously difficult to ascertain the proportion of failures, or the 
reasons why some trainees never started and others have stopped their 
businesses, because they are no longer present to be interviewed. There are 
many anecdotes, however, of Salima trainees who have “absconded”, particularly 
from their more remote locations, and it may be that in some cases the Salima 
authorities have located trainees in places where the demand is insufficient 
to justify a viable business. The quality of the technical training, however, 
is such that they should have been able to obtain jobs or perhaps start 
businesses elsewhere. Many vocational training institutions regard self 
employment as the last resort for those who cannot succeed in finding 
wage-employment; Salima appears to have developed an opposite culture, more 
suitable for current conditions, when finding a job with someone else is the 
resort of those who fail to start their own businesses. 
Impact and Lessons 
Although the results are not fully documented, the school can not 
unreasonably be considered as a qualified success; the cost per business 
started and surviving, at around $4,400, is undoubtedly very high, but some of 
these employ others, and they are generally providing services which were not 
otherwise available. Improvements could undoubtedly be made, but the school 
appears to be able to present a more convincing record than many more recently 
established “projects” with .fhr more generous funding. 
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It is not easy to ascribe reasons for such success as has been achieved, 
but the following aspects of the Salima Rural Trade School do appear to be I 
relatively different from many similar institutions, and are at least worthy 
of consideration by others working in the same field: 
- The School is perceived by applicants, trainees and society at large 
as being aimed at self-employment. This is not a second best to 
finding a job, but the main objective. 
- The trainees are selected on the basis of aptitude, personality and 
prior interest and experience rather than academic qualifications. 
- The trainees receive only a very small stipend; they need to 
supplement this through “hobby shop” sales as described, and this 
develops both self-reliance and a sensitivity to the needs of the 
market place. 
- The trainees make their own tools and receive no finance and only a 
very small supply of raw material. They have to be self-reliant from 
the start. 
- The programme explicitly inculcates self discipline and independence 
which are essential characteristics for the success of an informal 
sector enterprise. 
- The school is not, at least at present, an externally funded aid 
project but is locally supported and run, and is thus able to evolve 
its own programmes and to offer a degree of on-going support to its 
trainees on a long term basis. 
- The training lasts two years; the trainees are fully occupied during 
this period and are thus totally competent and confident at the end 
of the training. 
- The school is concerned with the location and post-training support Of 
its ex-trainees; they feel a part of the school’s “family” many Years 
after the training has been completed. 
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- me Salima Rural Trade School is an essentially Malawian institution, 
clearly related to the national philosophy of self- discipline and 
self-reliance. Clearly every country, and every institution must 
develop its own programmes and style, but any agency which is engaged 
in or is considering starting a programme to train people for informal 
self employment could learn a great deal from the Salima experience. 
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The'case of Mr. Phiri 
Mr. E. E. Phiri started his m,etalworks in a small town some 50 kilometers 
from Lilongwe in August 1982, immediately after leaving Salima. He makes hoes 
and other farm tools, and carries out simple repairs; he earns around $35 a 
month from his business. The local people have allowed him to build a small 
shelter on a piece of waste land without any rent, because they value his 
services. About half his sales are made on credit, which he carefully 
records; the others are paid for in cash. 
Raw material is his main problem, because of the cost of transport and 
time involved in obtaining it. He travels the 160 kilometers to Salima two or 
three times a year, both to collect materials, to obtain advice and to use the 
school's welding equipment, and he values his association with the school very 
highly. 
Mr. Phiri employed one helper for a short time, but had to dismiss him 
because he behaved badly in the local community. Mr. Phiri hopes to hire 
somebody else soon, because he cannot satisfy all his customers. He is 
supporting his younger brother and other members of his family, who stay with 
him from time to time. He spends most of his money on his family, but has 
succeeded in accumulating about $20 in a Post Office savings account. He is 
not becoming a rich man, but is satisfied with his business; "After all," he 
says, "I am doing a useful job for the people here, and they respect me for 
that. I am keeping myself and my family alive, and I know I should have tO 
depend on one of my other relatives if I had not started this business; I * 
a lucky man". 
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IV THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAMME IN HARGEISA, SOMALIA 
This case study describes a relatively recent vocational training 
assistance programme run by Partnership for Productivity (PfP), a United 
States based operation, for the Government of Somalia, funded by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID and by the Government of 
Somalia. This progratmne was based on rather extensive and lengthy research, 
and provides a large range of vocational and simple business training to 
camp-based and other refugees in North West Somalia. The clients are given 
training and simple advice, but credit is not available from the programme. 
The training is co-ordinated by the programme’s local staff and is mainly 
provided by local business people themselves, in their businesses and for a 
fee paid by the programme, rather than in a training centre. 
The programme merits inclusion in a study of training for the informal 
sector because of the wide range of training in response to local needs and, 
above all, trainees’ own preferences. This is possible because the training 
is provided by local small business people, using locally available materials 
and equipment. This not only permits a wider variety of skills to be offered 
but ensures that the training is both locally appropriate and economic. The 
maximum direct training cost per trainee does not exceed $60 per month. 
While it is too early to measure the results ,accurately, over half the 
trainees have started their own businesses or found formal sector employment 
after training; this figure is particularly remarkable since they are 
primarily refugees, operating in what must be one of the most economically 
depressed regions of the world. . 
+t ting 
The PfP Refugee Assistance Programme is based in Hargeisa, the major town 
and capital of North West Somalia with a population of approximately 250,000 ’ 
people. There is one sub-office in Hargeisa and two others in refugee camps 
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in the region. The camps are in effect squatter towns of around 9,000 to 
50,000 people each, with a limited but increasing degree of economic contact 
with the surrounding area, in many cases heavily inhibited by remote 
locations, and poor communications. 
Although very few people in this part of Somalia can be said to be 
without major problems, the refugees, in camps and outside, have to face the 
additional difficulties of personal dislocation and, in many cases, loss of 
employment they had in Ethiopia, which is their country of origin. They have 
little chance of acquiring land, or of obtaining jobs with the local 
administration. Although those living in the camps do receive subsistence 
rations, their housing is very poor and they are usually far removed from 
centres of settled population. . More importantly perhaps, the debilitating 
environment of the refugee camp must invariably lead to a sense of depression, 
dependance and loss of personal autonomy for all but the most resilient. 
The PfP programme is still operating; three expatriates and ten local 
advisers are employed, along with supporting administrative and other staff. 
In its first eight months the programme provided vocational training to a 
total of 272 refugees, in 16 different skills. A further 151 refugees 
received individual advice or other assistance. 
The PfP Somalia project was a direct response to the Government of 
Somalia’s policy, expressed in the 1982-1986 five year plan, to increase self- 
reliance and to accept the settlement of self-sufficient refugees. The 
project is one of several in Somalia with the same general objectives of self- 
reliance for refugees, run by a variety of agencies. 
Project Origins and Design 
PfP was invited to carry out an initial survey in May 1984, and specific 
proposals were formulated in an agreement between USAID, PfP and the 
Government in September 1984.. Further investigations were carried out ea*lY 
in 1985, and the local advisory staff were recruited between then and August’ .a.,, ; 
Ihey were then trained for ten weeks, so that vocational training itself did 
not start until October‘ 1985. 
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up to now the project has offered training and individual advice, but no 
assistance has been offered in the form of credit, raw materials, marketing 
services or premises. It is possible that such complementary assistance will 
be offered in the future, but results to date suggest that the emphasis on 
training is appropriate. 
The vocational training needs of the refugee community, and of the 
informal sector in Somalia in general, were assessed in some detail in the 
“Somalia Education and Human Resources Sector Assessment” of January 1984, and 
this information was supplemented by a further assessment by PfP entitled “An 
Opportunity to Contribute”, in April 1984. The training needs of refugees in 
Hargeisa and specified camps in North West Somalia were further assessed by 
PfP in May 1984 and early 1985. The essence of the whole project is that 
people request training in the skills they themselves feel they need; so long 
as these appear reasonable in terms of cost, markets, materials and 
“portability”, the project responds by arranging appropriate training either 
in an existing institution or, more frequently, in local business, The 
project design, therefore, does not lay down the specific skills in which 
training is to be offered, nor is the project tied down to any particular 
skills by specialised staff or facilities. 
Project design was not based on any similar activity which had been 
implemented elsewhere by PfP or, so far as is known by others, although it 
drew extensively on the experience of the expatriate staff and others in 
similar work in Botswana, Nepal, The Philippines, Kenya, India and other 
countries. 
Objectives and Activities 
The original aim of the project was to enable refugees in the North West 
region of Somalia to become self-sufficient by starting and running their own 
productive enterprises. The means by which this was to be achieved, in terms 
of training, individual advice, credit or other assistance were not originally 
stated, and although no funds for credit have been included in the present 
budget, credit and other services are being considered for the future. 
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Certain specific objectives as to the numbers of businesses to be started 
by refugees were laid down to be achieved in the first and second years of 
operation, that is from September 1984 to September 1985 and then until 
September 1986. Field operations started in January 1985. Effective 
management has kept spending well below budget, so that the project has now 
been extended twice to September 1986 and lately until May 1987. In spite of 
very lengthy delays in the start of actual operations, because of 
administrative difficulties, results to date are well ahead of target. As at 
September 1986 results in terms of numbers of people trained were over 40% 
ahead of budget, while spending was 30% below that expected. 
The training itself is in the main carried out by local business people 
in their own business, co-ordinated by the ten locally recruited advisers 
under the direction of the projects three expatriate staff, consisting of an 
engineer, a training specialist and the director. Training in basic carpentry 
and masonry, and in the manuafacture of tea-shop furniture, is provided 
through an existing vocational training institution following a syllabus 
developed by the project, and with direct cost funding and supervision 
provided from project sources. Courses on book-keeping and basic management 
are also given. Agricultural training is provided through a demonstration 
farm in one of the camps. 
The following numbers of people had thus been trained up to the end of 
June 1986, over periods ranging up to six months each; the training is still 
continuing. 
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Skills 
Sign Painting and Commercial Art 
Electric Wiring 
House Painting 
Brick Making 
Roof Construction 
Horticulture 
Baking 
Advanced Baking 
Confectionary Making 
Shoe Making 
Advanced Tailoring 
Carpentry 
Masonry 
Tea-shop Furniture Making 
Cooking 
Book-keeping and Simple Management 
Number of People 
13 
12 
5 
8 
12 
15 
8 
5 
20 
9 
10 
17 
17 
15 
6 
100 
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In addition, large numbers of business people have received individual 
on-site advice from the business extension staff. 
Courses were arranged in response to applicants’ requests, as described 
above, and were aimed mainly to help people to become self-employed rather 
than to obtain jobs with others. It was expected, and has happened, that a 
number would find jobs first and would then move up to self-employment having 
gained experience and business exposure in this way. The courses were 
designed by the training specialists in conjunction with the business advisers 
who actually handled the applications, and in discussion with the business 
people who were selected to conduct the training itself. The skills training 
follows an apprenticeship rather than a formal classroom approach; the 
trainer business people are paid $20 a month per trainee plus the cost of any 
materials that are used in training, and an allowance of $1.50 per day per 
trainee which they in turn pay as an apprentice wage. This is about one third 
of a skilled person’s daily wage in the area, but it does mean that the 
trainees are and feel themselves to be employed not by the project but by the 
trainers, rather than being students. 
Th training delivered by business people is closely and rigorously 
supervised by the project’s eight local business advisers, two local training 
specialists and the expatriate staff. This method of training ensures that 
the content is simple, practical and relevant to actual business conditions in 
the area. In every case standards of quality .control, design and so on are 
set by the local market’s demands. 
Inputs and Outputs 
The total budget of the project for two years was $900,000; of this 
$360,000, is f,or expatriate staff and associated expenses, $240,000 for head 
office and local overheads, $145,000 for local staff and $155,000 for 
connnodities and other miscelaneous items, The budget was 30% underspent in 
September 1986, so that the project’s life has been extended. 
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The actual out-of-pocket costs for training are limited to a maximum of 
$60 per month per trainee, including their allowances, materials and the fee 
for the trainer business person. Around 20 business people have so far acted 
as trainers in addition to the staff of the vocational institutions. 
Applicants for training are received, assessed and selected by the project’s 
team of eight advisers, operating out of the three sub-offices. They pass on 
the training requests to the local training manager who plans the training and 
selects the trainer business persons. 
The advisers also provide individual counselling to applicant trainees 
and many other refugees who ati in business already or intend to start. These 
advisers, and the training manager, were selected from more than 460 
candidates through a variety of tests of basic mathematics and English, and of 
their aptitude and attitudes to business, and were intensively trained for ten 
weeks, using training material drawn from earlier experience in Africa and 
elsewhere, and including field visits to another programme assisting refugee 
enterprises. They continue to receive training for two days or more each 
month, visiting head office regularly for this purpose. 
The 272 people who have been trained are selected by the business 
advisers on the basis of their apparant seriousness, prior experience and 
willingness to accept training, ability to articulate their plan to start a 
business and their aptitude to acquire skills as tested and assessed by the 
Somali instructor. There are no offers of loans or grants to “pollute” the 
motives of those who seek training, thus avoiding many of the problems which 
have been associated with refugee-enterprise promotion programmes in the 
past. The plan which applicants submit must relate to goods or services for 
which there is a demand in or around the camps; the project should be based 
on locally available raw materials, whether imported or not, and the business 
should be “portable” so that the refugees can take it back to Ethiopia or 
elsewhere if they lacer decide to re-settle or return home. The skills must 
be such that they can be acquired in less than six months, in order to limit 
costs and allow as many people as possible to be trained; .the direct cost of 
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training must be less than $60 a month, and it should be possible to start the 
business proposed with $50 or less of initial capital. This ensures labour- 
intensity, and it appears that few trainees have been unable to raise this 
modest sum; it does not therefore appear necessary to provide credit in 
addition to training at this time. People who wish to go into simple 
manufacturing rather than services or trading are generally given preference, 
as can be seen from the above list of skills, but exceptions are made, notably 
for those who wish to learn simple management and book-keeping skills. 
The duration of the training depends on the skill needed; most courses last 
between one and three months but some are for up to six months. 
The advisers provide counselling to some of the people who have been 
trained, among others; this continuing contact allows them to monitor the 
programme’s success in terms of businesses started. As at June 1986 some 150 
of the 272 ex-trainees were in business. Some of the others had found 
employment, either locally or in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region or 
elsewhere; the remainder was unemployed in the area or could not be traced 
back. Results are encouraging as they are better than what has been achieved 
by similar programmes elsewhere. It is hoped that an even higher rate of 
business start-ups will be realised as the training is improved on the basis 
0 f experience. 
Impact and Lessons 
The PfP project is still in operation, and is likely to continue at least 
until April 1987. It has so far been considered successful, because the 
numbers trained and businesses started have been well over the target figures, 
and the costs have been kept well within budget. This success has been 
achieved at what might be considered a high cost of some $2,000 per enterprise 
started; this figure compares very favourably, however, with many other 
business promotion activities. When making calculations of this sort, many 
projects omit the starting capital which had to be obtained from banks or 
other sources, but in this case the starting capital’is so small that it does 
not materially effect the cost per business started or job created. This Cost 
should also drop as the project proceeds, both because of improved training 
and because the first year costs include many items for establishment of the 
project which will not be repeated. 
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me following features may have contributed to the successful results so 
far: 
A wide variety of training is provided, in skills which applicants 
ask for rather than those which are offered by the project. 
The training is not “resource driven”; by using local business 
people as trainers, in their own businesses, the project can respond 
to any relevant request. 
The trainers are mainly local business people, rather than 
specialist trainers without any business experience as is so often 
the case. 
The project “r caches out” to applicants through a network of sub- 
offices and field advisers; training is similarly provided in 
decentralised locations rather than in the centralised institution. 
The training allowance is very modest and is in itself not 
sufficient to motivate refugees to apply. It does however mean that 
they are employees, on the first rung of the ladder towards 
self-employment, they are carefully supervised so that they will not 
be exploited as cheap labour. The trainees learn about the need for 
quality, economy, reliability and so on because their work is 
subject to the disciplines of the market place. 
The project is tightly managed, costs and performance are rigorously 
monitored, and everyone works towards specific quantitative 
objectives. 
The project was designed not on the basis of any “model” from 
elsewhere but in response to local conditions. Other conditions are 
being introduced as needs change or experience suggests, and local 
staff sophistication and capacity improves. 
One of the main design criteria of the project is that its 
complexity must not exceed the ability of Local staff in concept or 
practice. The growth of the project and its activities is in line 
with the development of local staff, and it avoids activities which 
may have worked elsewhere but which are beyond the capacity of local 
staff at any particular stage. 
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The basic philosophy of the programme is to avoid standard “models”, as 
should already have been made clear. It is likely that similar approaches 
will be attempted elsewhere in Somalia by Government programmes, and further 
afield by USAID, but they will not attempt to apply what has been learned in 
Hargeisa “ready made” to any other situation. 
The idea of using local business people as trainers, in their businesses, 
is not new, and has been used in India, Nepal, Indonesia and elsewhere with 
some success. In general, however, the main lesson of the project is that 
training must be provided in response to prospective trainees’ own ideas, so 
long as these appear basically reasonable and economic in local circumstances, 
Training for informal enterprise is all too often limited to carpentry, 
building, vehicle maintenance and blacksmithing for men,, and tailoring and 
food preparation for women, all of which are provided in an institutional 
setting, with no emphasis on self-employment. The wide range of skills 
offered by this project, and the success in terms of businesses started, 
demonstrates that training for the informal sector can be locally relevant and 
responsive to local needs, and can result in large numbers of informal 
enterprises being s tatted, at reasonable cost, making maximum use of local 
staff, institutions, including businesses, and resources. 
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v. THE EURO-ACTION ACORD PROGRAMME IN PORT SUDAN, SUDAN 
This case study briefly describes the Euro-Action Acord small-scale 
enterprise programme in Port Sudan. This programme offers an integrated 
package of services, including credit of various kinds, marketing, premises, 
individual on-site advice and training to existing and new informal sector 
enterprises in the Deims, or squatter settlements , which surround the city of 
Port Sudan on the Red Sea. 
The programme is remarkable for a number of reasons; it was based on an 
unusually lengthy period of research into the community, it has evolved and 
changed continually since it started, it is “owned” and managed by its own 
staff in a very remarkable way and has achieved very striking results among 
what must be one of the neediest urban communities anywhere, living and 
working in a region almost totally devoid of natural resources, suffering from 
permanent shortages of raw material and with very limited markets. The 
results demonstrate that success can be achieved almost anywhere, with 
c ommi tment , flexibility and a firm belief in the ability of informal sector 
entrepreneurs to help themselves. 
Setting 
The EAA Small Enterprise Programme is located in Port Sudan. The modest, 
central administrative office is in the older part of the city, and the five 
operating offices are each located in one of the surrounding Deims or squatter 
settlements which have in recent years grown up in the desert around the city. 
The population of Port Sudan has approximatley doubled in the last ten 
years, and approaches half a million people; some 80X live in the Deims, 
mainly in makeshift housing with no security of tenure, and with no formal 
infrastruture apart from a very eratic water supply, each outlet serving 
thousands of households. 
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The people are from a wide variety of ethnic groups; many are nomads who 
have migrated to the city as a result of persistent drought in the Red Sea 
hills, while others are refugees from Eritrea and other parts of neighbouring 
Ethiopia. Some of these have come direct along the coast from Ethiopia, while 
others have come via refugee camps in the Kasala and Gedaref areas. 
Port Sudan is the only significant harbour serving the whole of Sudan, 
but because of the very poor economic situation the amount of traffic, in 
either direction, has fallen very heavily in recent years. The biggest single 
item is relief food supplies, which are unloaded in the port for onward 
transport to the vast refugee camps in other parts of the country, and to the 
south. The shipping, and the large numbers of lorries which transport most of 
the imports and exports, create a certain amount of employment of various 
kinds ; there are a few medium sized modern sector factories, but the formal 
employment opportunities are only sufficient for a very small proportion of 
the population. Large numbers of people have in the past gone through Port 
Sudan for work in Saudi Arabia and other oil producing states, but this source 
of income has recently been drastically reduced. 
The majority of the people, therefore, and particularly the newcomers, 
must rely on the self-generated economy of the squatter settlements for their 
livelihood. The informal sector is only “peripheral” or dependant on the 
formal sector in a very theoretical sense, since it is largely self-sufficient. 
There is extensive,poverty in the Deims, with most households spending up 
to 80 or 90% of their income on food and water; there are severe health and 
nutrition problems, medical care is inadequate; there are a large proportion . 
of single parent families. Many people have traditional craft skills; there 
is some limited supply of scrap raw materials from the port, and there is 
still a substantial flow of remittances and supplies from Saudi Arabia. 
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me Government of Sudan is generally unprejudiced in its attitudes to the 
informal sector; the growth of the squatter areas, and of the 
income-generating activities within them, has not been seriously inhibited by 
any government controls. The Government also adopts a liberal policy towards 
refugee settlements, but the political and economic situation has been such 
that it has been impossible for the state to provide even the most modest 
level of services. The EAA programme is therefore free to operate, and its 
activities are generally consistent with government policy, even though the 
government lacks the resources to implement these policies itself. 
Project Origins and Design 
Euro-Action Acord is a small agency which evolved several years ago out 
of the efforts of a number of European and other voluntary agencies to develop 
assistance projects for the Sahel. It is a voluntary agency in the genuine 
sense of the word, relying to a substantial extent on voluntary contributions 
and on expatriate staff who are paid far below the normal rates associated 
with official agencies. 
The agency is elsewhere involved in agricultural work, in a number of 
countries, and had no experience of urban activities. Because of its 
remarkably successful programmes in the Qua1 En Nahal farming project near 
Gedaref, where Large numbers of refugees had been successfully settled in 
self-sustaining agricultural communities, the Government’s Commissioner for 
Refugees asked EAA to do something to help these spontaneously settled 
refugees in Port Sudan. 
The husband and wife team who designed and initially managed the project 
spent eighteen months studying the community and designing the outlines of the 
programme. They approached the situation with no preconceptions as to what 
services where needed ; although they developed a detailed proposal, the 
actual programme has deviated substantially from the original as a result Of 
field experience. The project was funded by EAA itself with contributions 
from its member agencies and from the European Development Fund and other 
international organisations. 
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The principal need was identified to be credit, and this has remained the 
core of the programme; the rather substantial skills upgrading activity is 
undertaken partly through very simple, individual management consultancy, 
carried out by local staff who are responsible for the lending programme; 
group training in tailoring and other craft skills, and in basic literacy, has 
been sub-contracted to local people as an income-generating enterprise in 
itself, which is now self-sustaining and requires Little or no assistance from 
the project in terns of staffing or subsidy. 
The programme is designed to respond directly to its target 
beneficiaries, or “clients” as they are more correctly regarded. AL though 
every effort was made initially to detemine the needs of the community, it 
was decided from the beginning that clients would pay for every service; as a 
result the “market” has operated as the major determinant of the nature and 
amount 0 f services offered, and it has not been necessary to carry out 
separate studies of the impact of the project. 
Although the project has drawn extensively on experience elsewhere, the 
total design is unique, and there are a number of individual features which 
are in themselves most unusual: 
- A significant charge is made for every service that is offered, and 
this income now covers about 25% of all project costs; 
- CLients are only accepted after exhaustive enquiries detemine that 
the average income per head of their household is below a certain very 
low Level; 
- The expatriate staff maintain a very low profile, and both day-to-day 
and major decisions are forcibly devolved to Local staff. 
As with most effective programmes, these and other features were very 
much a function of those who were involved at the beginning; there are 
nevertheless a number of lessons which can be Learned from it, which can and 
indeed have been applied elsewhere. 1. 
- 35 - 
Objectives and Activities 
The original aim of the project was to assist the spontaneously settled 
refugees in Port Sudan to improve their situation; the actual activities, and 
indeed the target group, were detemined and modified during the eighteen 
month period referred to earlier. It was decided that the best way to assist 
the people was to help them to become self-sufficient; given the environment, 
the only way in which they could do this was by setting up small-scale, 
informal sector enterprises. It was also recognised that it would be 
inappropriate, and in any case probably impossible to assist only refugees; 
all the people of the squatter settlements are in need, and there is no 
fundamental difference between those who came there because of political 
problems and those who have come because of drought or other hardships. Women 
were determined to be in particular need, since there were so many female 
heads of households, and it is particularly difficult for women in that 
society to make an independant living. 
It was detemined from the outset that the prograxmne shouLd itself be run 
on business Lines; no services are given away, results are continuously 
measured and appraised by the staff who are themselves responsible for 
evaluation; the services to be offered, including training, must respond to 
the demands of clients rather than be preconceived on the basis of what the 
agency believes to be necessary or as the result of a process of consultation 
which may or may not elicit the actual needs of the target group. In addition 
to training, credit is supplied for equipment and for working capital, and 
technical and marketing assistance and workspace are also provided. 
The training is mainly provided on a one-to-one basis by a team of 
nineteen business consultants, operating from five field offices. About half 
of the consultants are women; all of them have been recruited from the 
diverse refugee and other communities which make up the squatter population of 
Port Sudan. The consultants themselves were trained over a period of several 
weeks, using material previously evolved in Kenya and elsewhere, together with 
large numbers of field exercises and other content developed during the 
initial period of investigation. Training continues through regular 
in-service sessions, using current client experiences as case studies. Each 
consultant deals with up to thirty clients, and these are engaged in a wide 
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variety of businesses; tailors are the most numerous, foLlowed by carpenters, 
water sellers, tea shops and Local food processors, but they also include 
launderers, metal workers, builders, handicraft makers, repairers of many 
kinds and many other activities. 
The on-site training, or consultancy, focuses mainly on simple business 
management, and is closely Linked to the credit facilities provided by the 
programme; the advice which is given depends on each individual client, but 
covers items such as: 
- Simple book-keeping, and the use of this infomation to reduce costs 
and improve results; 
- Improved marketing, particularly advising clients how to move from the 
total dependence on individual customers’ advances to the manufacture 
of ready made garments, furniture and other items; 
- The use of simple selling aids, such as signs, or attendance at local 
markets; 
- Improved “housekeeping”, better quality to improved workmanship and 
improved cleanliness of premises. 
This simple management training takes place right there where clients 
work. The consultants are trained to avoid making standard recommendations; 
they diagnose the problems of each client, and attempt to elicit suggestions 
for improvement from the clients themselves, so that they “own” the new ideas 
and are thus more likely to implement them. 
Results can generally be directly measured by looking at loan repayments 
and business perfomance; a small number of clients take advice without 
credit, but all pay for the consultancy a fixed proportion of their income at 
the start of the service; this ensures that the advice is useful, and that 
the service is not continued beyond the point when it would be unnecessary. 
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me programme also arranges for technical skills training which is 
conducted by business people in the community for a fee; these people have in 
some cases been offering training services before, and in other cases have 
started at EAA’s suggestion, but their clients always pay at Least a 
proportion of the cost, thus adhering to the principle of payment and eventual 
self- sustained ability. 
Inputs and Outputs 
The programme costs about 750,000 Sudanese Pounds per annum. Of this 
approximately one third is used to increase the revolving loan fund, which is 
continuously replenished and expanded through repayments and the interest and 
administrative payments of 2% per month for equipment loans and 1% per week 
for working-capital finance. A further third is used for local staff costs, 
and the remaining third, or rather less, covers expatriate staff and 
associated expenses, 
Nineteen consultants/trainers are employed; they were selected on the 
basis of their apparant potential and interest, in a highly subjective but 
apparantly successful way. 
The cLients for services are rigorously selected on the basis of the 
following criteria: 
They must pay a nominal but to them a significant registration fee; 
They must have been resident in Port Sudan for at least two years; 
The household income per head must not be above a nominated poverty 
level per month (this figure is changed quite frequently, because of 
inflation, but is barely above survival level); 
All things being equal, refugees, women and disabled people are given 
preference; 
Clients must accept a fuL1 survey of their household and their 
business, if it has already started. They must also agree to pay for 
the consultancy, to pay a fine for late repayments of loans and to pay 
commissions on any orders which the project may arrange. 
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After two years of operations a total of 851 clients have been assisted, 
of which all except 4 have received Loans as well as on-site and possibly 
group training. There have been 72 defaults, for under 4% of the amount 
lent. Approximately one third of the clients have been refugees while about 
3 5% have been women. The period of client service varies according to their 
willingness to pay and to the maturity of the Loans which are for a maximum of 
20 months and minimum of a week. Approximately three out of four clients are 
still receiving and paying for advice after 2 years, and the total number of 
clients and the repayment performance are well ahead of the targets originally 
set. 
Imoact and Lessons 
The EAA programme is continuing to expand and is regularly and 
automatically evaluated in terns of client performance, loan repayments and 
fees. One external evaluation has taken place, which was intended to suggest 
and introduce possible improvements after the first year of operation. Nearly 
20% of the programme costs are now being met by fees, commissions and interest 
earnings, and the local staff are fully committed to the eventual goal of 
creating a self-sustaining business training and credit operation. 
The programme is undoubtedly successful, both by reference to its own 
original targets and to similar efforts eLseGhere. A similar programme has 
been introduced, on a smaller scale, in a squatter area in Lusaka, and various 
aspects of the EAA programme have also been applied in Senegal, The Caribbean 
and elsewhere. It would clearly be wrong for this complete programme, or any 
other, to be “repLicated” in other places, as any programme, and indeed any 
form of training or other assistance must be based on individual 
circumstances. There are however a number of features of the EAA programme 
which are of relevance to other attempts to train and assist informal sector 
business people, some of which have been already applied elsewhere with 
success. These include: 
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- The programme was not imposed ready-made from outside, but was 
designed specificaLLy for Local circumstances and local people, based 
on extensive investigation; 
- The programme is not part of a government or other national activity, 
but was initiated and run by a small voluntary agency, on a local 
basis ; 
- The programme relies almost entirely on trainers and other staff 
recruited from the community it is serving; very little use is made 
of expatriates; 
- Decisions on the strategic design and day to day conduct of the 
programme are devolved, forcibly if necessary, to the local operating 
staff. The main function of the one remaining expatriate staff is to 
set the framework for the programme to evolve as its Local staff 
decide ; 
- The programme is run as a “tight ship” with rigorous financial 
management and tight adherence to basic disciplines such as record 
keeping, attendance, adherence to budgets and self-managment; 
- The client population, in spite of their extreme poverty, pay 
something for every service they receive; 
- Anybody who confoms to the basic poverty standards and is willing to 
follow the rules of the programme is eligible for assistance; there 
is no attempt to exclude particular sections of the community, or to 
favour any particular type of enterprise. 
The E&4 programme, is, like all such activities, very much a function of 
the personality of its initiators; it has evolved in response to local 
conditions and decisions of Local staff. The operating details, consultancy 
training process, internal management, recording systems and so on are far 
less important than the basic philosophy of flexibility and respect for local 
staff and client potential which has pervaded the prograuane from its inception. 
- 40 - 
CONCLUSIONS 
A sample of four very different programmes is obviously an insufficient 
basis for any general conclusions. Generalisations are of little value in any 
aspect of development, and particularly in the infomal sector, which is so 
large, so ill-defined and so varied. It may nevertheless be worthwhile to 
search for some common features in the four programmes, and to see what 
bearing they may have on some of the initial questions which must face anyone 
attempting to design or run something similar. 
It has often been said that the origin and institutional basis of any 
programme are more important than the details of its design. Only the 
Carvajal Programme in Cali was of purely local origin and sponsorship; the 
other three were initiated from outside and depended on foreign finance. Only 
the PfP programme in Hargeisa, Somalia, was directly funded by official aid, 
however, and it may be significant that this programme is probably the least 
cost-effective of the four. Its implementing.organisation, has in fact gone 
out of business since the case study was written. 
Control and management of the Hargeisa and Port Sudan prograrmnes were in 
the hands of expatriates, but they were very few in number and most of the 
day-to-day decisions were actually made by Local staff. The expatriates were 
to some extent distant from the details, through language and other 
communication problems and because they wanted it this way. All four 
programmes seem to point to the merits of minimal foreign involvement and 
maximum delegation of decisions and actual training activity to local people, 
drawn from the community where the programme operates. The trainers or 
advisers, as well as their direct supervisors, were in every case local people. 
The Malawi programme relied mainly on classroom or fomal workshop 
instruction; in Colombia the classroom was really a supplement to on-site 
advice; in Sudan there was no classroom training at all, except for one or 
two brief technical courses which were delegated to local, private training 
schools; and in Somalia the bulk of the training was carried out in local 
businesses, by local business people. 
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There also appears to be a common thread in the sacrifice trainees are 
expected to make in return for their training; the Colombian and Sudanese 
business people pay what to them are substantial sums for the services they 
recieve, and the students in Malawi have to undertake a lengthy and fiercely 
discipLined regime as part of the training course. The refugees in Somalia 
may not be able to pay in cash for their training, but they are not paid a 
stipend as such. They are paid for the work they do in the businesses where 
they are also being trained. 
The clearest common factor, however, which is perhaps more apparent to a 
field visitor than to a reader of case studies, is the rigorous management 
which pervades all four programmes. The Carvajal Foundation is funded and 
intimately related to the Carvajal Company, which is a remarkably well-run and 
successful enterprise. The Salima Rural Trade School in Malawi is run’on 
strict military Lines, with amy officers actually involved in its 
management. The Port Sudan programme is run with an efficiency which shows 
for the many years one of its directors had worked in the Federal Republic of 
Ge many. Similarly, the director of the PfP programme in Somalia had lengthy 
experience of mass commercial catering management in the United States. The 
nature of the enterprises previously managed by those responsible for the 
programmes differs enomously, but all are based on strict administration, 
rigorous discipline, regular quantitative evaluation and a sense of 
responsibility for results. It may be that the relative success of these 
programmes, and of many others, is far more affected by the quality of their 
management than by any details of their operation. The success of any 
enterprise depends ultimately on good management, and training for the 
informal sector may be seen as an enterprise in its own right. 
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